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Committee Charge 
Medical advances in the past century have dramatically increased our ability to contain and 
prevent disease outbreaks. Concurrently, however, increased globalization and rapid 
population growth mean that diseases can transmit faster and to more people than ever before.  
Many experts view avian influenza (AI) as the most likely cause of a human pandemic in the 
near future. Few studies have focused on analyzing US technology procurement policies from 
a holistic perspective integrating technological, economic, and social analyses. This type of 
analysis is critical in designing effective, comprehensive policies to limit the potential impact 
of an AI pandemic. 
The objectives of this study are therefore to (1) determine what technologies are available to 
address an AI pandemic and (2) to determine what policies are already adopted or should be 
adopted to effectively procure these technologies. By understanding these issues, we hope to 
allow policymakers to make more informed decisions regarding pre-pandemic preparations. 
Questions we will address include the following: 
1) What technologies are important to procure in order to reduce the impact of pandemic 
influenza? 
2) What has impacted the availability of these technologies?  
3) What policies should the US adopt or implement to ensure the availability of the critical 
technologies needed to reduce the effect of pandemic influenza? 
a) What challenges face the adoption or implementation of these policies?
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Executive Summary 
Many experts fear that an influenza pandemic will occur in the near future. There is currently 
much debate about how the US should best prepare. Previous US responses give only minimal 
guidance as the last major influenza pandemic occurred nearly a century ago—before flu 
viruses had ever been isolated.  
An influenza pandemic could spread quickly, and working estimates are that 30% of the US 
population will be infected - although the virulence of the virus will greatly affect mortality 
rates amongst those infected (HHS, 2005). Comprehensive pre-pandemic planning is needed, 
and in October 2005, the Bush Administration launched the National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness and Response. A cornerstone of this strategy is government 
procurement of resources that will be needed in the event of a pandemic influenza outbreak. 
For example, $1.76 billion, out of the $7.1 billion that the President requested for the National 
Strategy will be "spent on increasing vaccine production." (Agnuwobi, 2006). A wide range of 
state and federal government agencies, as well as private industries, are engaged in efforts to 
limit the impact of an avian influenza pandemic on the US. 
In this report, we survey the technologies available for surveillance, diagnosis, containment, 
treatment, and prevention of an AI pandemic in humans. We focus our analysis on those 
technologies that the US government might need to procure prior to or during a pandemic. We 
perform a comparative market analysis and reach conclusions about which technologies the 
government needs to procure. Finally, we discuss the challenges the government may 
encounter in procuring adequate supplies prior to an AI pandemic.  
In conducting our research, we were guided by the following four framing questions: 
1) What technologies are important to procure in order to reduce the impact of pandemic 
influenza? 
2) What has impacted the availability of these technologies?  
3) What policies should the US adopt or implement to ensure the availability of the critical 
technologies needed to reduce the effect of pandemic influenza? 
a) What challenges face the adoption or implementation of these policies? 
Upon the emergence of a pandemic virus, immediate demand surges can be expected. 
Anticipating shortages, governments have already begun to stockpile key technologies such as 
antivirals and facemasks. However, even with adequate funds for purchasing supplies, market 
conditions will render some technologies unavailable without other government interventions. 
Government procurement can improve the supply of technologies needed for pandemic 
response.  
The markets for the technologies relevant to avian influenza vary significantly in terms of their 
competitiveness, cost to entry, regulatory environment, and degree of excess manufacturing 
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capacity, among other factors. The ability of the government to procure supplies of 
technologies, and the urgency for doing so, depends heavily on the market conditions for each 
technology. Our analysis matches each technology with specific procurement policy options 
and considers the various stakeholders involved in procurement. In the various phases of the 
pandemic, different technologies will be most relevant. In addition, technologies are used in a 
range of different contexts.  
In order to consider these technologies holistically in the context of the evolution of a global 
pandemic, the committee developed a technology map framework to guide our analysis. 
Technologies were mapped onto the framework using two dimensions: pandemic phases and 
types of action. We considered seven pandemic phases spanning from limited animal 
outbreaks to major human outbreaks; the types of action were detection, observation, 
containment, treatment and prevention. 
Critical technologies that the government might want to procure prior to a pandemic were 
derived from an extensive literature review and from feedback provided by experts throughout 
the field of pandemic preparedness. After analyzing the role and specific strengths of each, the 
committee placed each technology on the map. The technology map allowed us to understand 
the various interdependencies between technologies and the relative importance of these 
technologies in each phase. 
In looking holistically at the set of technologies, we observed that technologies targeted at 
containment, treatment and prevention are, in general, unlikely to be adequately supplied by 
the market in the event of a pandemic. Government pre-pandemic preparations are especially 
important for these technologies including vaccines, antiviral drugs, facemasks, and 
ventilators.  
In contrast, we found that technologies for diagnosis and observation will likely be provided 
by the market in adequate supply. In addition, we found that procurement of these 
technologies is less relevant to pre-pandemic preparedness as they have only minimal roles in 
emergency response. 
In light of our analysis, we make five recommendations. 
Recommendation 1: Government should limit research and 
development support for technologies that are adequately provided 
through market forces. 
We recommend that the government focus research and development funding on those 
technologies that are not supported fully by the market. Research and development funding is 
most critical when conditions do not exist for the competitive production and development of 
technologies in the market. There are many demands on the funding that has been made 
available for pandemic influenza, and this recommendation calls for careful prioritization of 
this funding.  
Conditions for competitive production and development of diagnostic tests are in place. There 
appears to be no shortage in the supply of these tests and production could be significantly 
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increased if demand were to increase. However, for technologies such as vaccines and 
antivirals, there is a clear need for government support of R&D efforts.  
We suggest that this recommendation could be implemented through a formal mechanism that 
allows scientists, economists, public health officials, and health care providers to work 
together to establish research priorities with respect to influenza preparedness.  
Recommendation 2: Government must stockpile critical technologies 
that are available.  
The timeframe governing the emergence of a pandemic is highly uncertain. As a result, private 
companies have little incentive to significantly increase production before a pandemic 
emerges. Even in those industries that have significant production capabilities, such as 
facemasks and ventilators, there will be a delay between the pandemic emerging and any 
significant increases in production. Therefore, it is critical that the government stockpile the 
supplies that are likely to be needed immediately upon the outbreak of a pandemic. 
Stockpiling targets for technologies such as ventilators should be reexamined in light of our 
analysis. 
Recommendation 3: The US government should actively provide 
markets for critical technologies where a market does not currently 
exist. 
For pandemic vaccines as well as new antivirals government should actively participate in the 
creation of markets for critical technologies both by supporting their production and through 
demand stimulation. Potential policies include advance purchase agreements and the creation 
of award systems for prototype vaccine development. These policies could give companies the 
confidence to invest in what would otherwise be a risky investment. In addition, expanding 
current seasonal flu vaccine programs could provide immediate demand incentives to expand 
capacity or improve manufacturing efficiency.  
Setting an appropriate timeline that ensures the government receives products while they 
could still be of use is essential. However, a timeline that is too rigid could reduce willingness 
on behalf of pharmaceutical companies to commit to development. In order to achieve their 
desired end, these agreements must adequately balance the need for rapid production with 
reasonable consideration of possible delays.  
In the case of awards for vaccine development, vaccine manufacturers would be encouraged 
to develop prototype vaccines based on strains similar to the one likely to cause a pandemic. 
The manufacturers would carry out clinical trials on these vaccines and receive regulatory 
approval. Then once a pandemic emerged the companies could submit applications to 
regulatory agencies considering the new vaccines simply ‘variants’ of their previous products 
rather than entirely new vaccines (requiring the same rigorous clinical studies and approval 
processes).  
Finally, it may be possible to increase pandemic vaccine supply indirectly by expanding 
current seasonal flu vaccine programs. The expansion of seasonal flu vaccine programs would 
provide a guaranteed market for manufacturers of seasonal vaccines, and encourage near term 
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capacity expansion or improved yields within existing plants. Additional capacity created 
through this process could then be used to produce greater quantities of pandemic vaccines if a 
pandemic emerges. A primary challenge to this approach is that it would require increased 
buy-in from citizens in order to be successful. If the government is not able to successfully 
encourage demand increases for seasonal influenza vaccines, it will have wasted valuable 
resources. In addition, it will be difficult for the government to predict in advance the potential 
capacity expansion that might result from increasing the demand for influenza vaccines, so it 
is likely that this policy is best used as a complement to other policies for increasing demand.  
Recommendation 4: The US Government should institute emergency 
fast-track approval and liability protection for vaccine and antiviral 
manufacturers.  
Development of a vaccine targeted at pandemic AI cannot commence until the pandemic virus 
strain has been isolated, and development alone is likely to take on the order of six months. 
Thus, it will be necessary to use fast-track approval for a new vaccine in order to provide for 
production and distribution that is as rapid as possible after the onset of the pandemic. In 
addition, the importance of vaccines in limiting the loss of lives during a pandemic warrants 
liability protection for manufacturers. Similar treatment is also necessary for new antiviral 
drugs. Current reliance on one antiviral drug leaves antiviral resistance as a large vulnerability. 
Alternative antiviral drugs should be considered for fast track approval by the FDA.  
The public’s safety should be the dominant consideration in the implementation of this 
recommendation. A balance must be struck between protecting pharmaceutical companies 
from unforeseeable problems with new drugs and encouraging strict adherence to quality 
manufacturing practices. Liability protection should not exempt companies from damages due 
to reckless development strategies or unsafe manufacturing environments.  
Recommendation 5: The government should provide incentives for 
manufacturers to increase domestic manufacturing capacity of critical 
technologies. 
If pandemic influenza reaches the US, it will probably already have affected other parts of the 
world. Pandemic emergencies abroad will likely lead to international supply chain disruptions. 
Foreign manufacturing facilities may not fulfill contracts if the country in which they are 
based experiences a pandemic crisis. Without domestic manufacturing capacity, the US 
cannot ensure adequate supplies of vaccines, antiviral drugs, and other crucial AI 
technologies.  
Increasing domestic manufacturing capacity requires that the government provide 
economic incentives to manufacturers of critical technologies. These incentives should 
encourage both domestic and foreign manufacturers to expand or build plants in the US. 
Incentives should also address production time. For example, advance purchase 
agreements might take into account manufacturing time by having the government pay 
more to vaccine companies if they produce vaccines faster. Alternatively, the government 
could directly subsidize manufacturing expansion, or provide tax incentives to entice 
foreign firms to build plants in the US. 
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Another advantage of domestic manufacturing capacity is increased government scrutiny and 
response. For example, British vaccine manufacturer Chiron discovered contamination in 
several influenza vaccine batches in 2004. The US government stopped importation of 
Chiron’s vaccines, leaving the US with only half its expected supply (Pearson, 2004). Had this 
problem occurred in a US facility, the FDA may have been able to respond quickly and work 
with the manufacturer to resolve the problem, thereby preventing the supply disruption. 
Government policy already addresses this recommendation to some degree. The 
government recently gave $1 billion to five vaccine manufacturers to install domestic 
vaccine plants that use new, efficient cell-based production methods. Additionally, the 
government has negotiated with Roche to increase its antiviral production capacity on US 
soil over the next several years. 
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Introduction 
Since 2003, widespread outbreaks of a lethal avian influenza (AI) in poultry have generated 
significant concern about the threat of a global influenza pandemic. The disease has impacted 
bird populations across much of Asia and has expanded rapidly into both Europe and Africa. 
While the disease has been blamed for only 154 human deaths thus far (WHO, Nov 2006), 
experts fear that the virus may evolve to become readily transmissible between humans, 
causing a human influenza pandemic. This report is concerned with the response of the United 
States to the current pandemic threat. 
This report addresses procurement policy options that the United States could implement prior 
to the emergence of a pandemic virus. The report will assess how these policies fit into the 
broader framework of addressing AI and recommends policies the US Government should 
enact to effectively limit the impact of an AI pandemic. Specific questions this report 
addresses are the following:  
1) What technologies are important to procure in order to reduce the impact of pandemic 
influenza? 
2) What has impacted the availability of these technologies?  
3) What policies should the US adopt or implement to ensure the availability of the critical 
technologies needed to reduce the effect of pandemic influenza? 
a) What challenges face the adoption or implementation of these policies? 
This report represents the first comprehensive look at pre-pandemic procurement policy 
options known to the authors. The majority of previous work has focused on individual 
technologies or single policy options in narrow organizational contexts. In this report the 
authors study a wide range of technologies and their interdependencies, and develop a 
framework for analyzing policy options for these technologies that will be useful in other 
pandemics. In addition, we compare the market and policy conditions facing each technology, 
and assess where government procurement might be the most effective in terms of limiting the 
impact of the virus on humans. Previous reports that have attempted a broader view of pre-
pandemic procurement have rarely conducted such comparative analyses of different 
technologies and their markets.  
Given that human infection with avian influenza has already occurred, this report focuses on 
procurement of technologies that are important to limiting the impacts of the virus once it 
develops the ability to spread efficiently among humans. The analysis matches each 
technology with specific procurement policy options and considers the various stakeholders 
involved in procurement. We have adopted a broad definition of procurement that covers the 
range of policies spanning between short-term stockpiling of existing products and longer 
term research and development into new technologies. This definition has given us the 
freedom to include many of the interactions between procurement and other types of policy 
instruments. 
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Scope of this report 
This report examines the technology and policy solutions necessary to prevent mass loss of 
human life from an AI pandemic. It addresses the technology and policy responses pertinent to 
the United States, and it is primarily concerned with the potential economic and health impacts 
on the human population.  
The AI problem is global and it must be tackled through international co-operation. Therefore 
this report is global in its reach. Our recommendations, however, deal with the US response to 
such a pandemic because this report is aimed towards US policymakers. Accordingly, we 
have not made recommendations for other governments, international organizations, or private 
entities. This report is intended for policy makers but will be useful to those with little or no 
technical expertise in the technologies being examined. 
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Background 
Influenza has ravaged human and animal populations throughout history. Increasing 
population density, the growth of mega-farms, and increasing global connectedness due to 
industrialization, however, have amplified the risks of influenza infections leading to 
pandemics. This was best exemplified by the 1918 “Spanish Flu” pandemic, which killed over 
20 million people worldwide and caused illness in 20% to 40% of the world population (HHS, 
2004). Experts believe that the 1918 pandemic originated from birds (CDC, Jan 2006). The 
H5N1 strain of avian influenza is the latest in a list of possible influenza pandemic threats, and 
its history is explored in this section. 
US Procurement: Previous Influenza Outbreaks 
In developing preparedness policy for avian influenza, it is instructive to review the 
effectiveness of government responses to past outbreaks of virulent forms of influenza. Four 
notable outbreaks of influenza have occurred in the US in the past century, and government 
response varied significantly among them: the “Spanish Flu” of 1918, the “Asian Flu” of 
1957-58, the “Hong Kong Flu” of 1968-69, and the “Swine Flu” scare of 1976. 
Although there had been sporadic flu outbreaks in the US prior to the 20th century, none were 
on a large enough scale to warrant government intervention. The first serious flu pandemic 
affecting the US was the Spanish Flu of 1918. It first surfaced at an army base in Kansas and 
rapidly spread among US military personnel as troops contacted each other in packed troop 
transports and at bases. Despite warnings by military medical personnel, President Woodrow 
Wilson ordered deployment of troops to Europe to fight in World War I, further increasing the 
number of victims. As doctors, scientists, and lab technicians were drafted into the military to 
help fight the flu, civilian medical services were left debilitated. Influenza quickly swept 
across the globe killing 675,000 Americans (~0.5% of the population) between September 
1918 and June 1919 (Garrett, 2005) and an estimated 20 to 50 million people worldwide 
(CDC, Jan 2006). Eventually, after many waves, the virus mutated towards a less lethal form, 
ending the pandemic without an effective intervention by medical science (Knobler, Mack, 
Mahmoud, Lemon, 2005).  
No preparations for an influenza outbreak had been made prior to the 1918 outbreak as 
scientific understanding of viruses did not exist. However, many of the actions taken once the 
pandemic emerged have relevance today.1 These actions included reducing the size and 
number of public gatherings, staggering work schedules, isolating uninfected towns, isolating 
patients, and closing schools to decrease person-to-person contact. People also began wearing 
facemasks in public (Barry, 2004). The Red Cross alone contributed $575,000 (Crosby, 1976) 
to aid the 1918 pandemic response; this is equivalent in 2006 dollars to what the Federal 
Government is contributing to the current crisis. No reliable estimates have been made of the 
cost to the government of the 1918 pandemic. However, the ongoing First World War 
competed for both money and resources.  
                                                 
1 Discussion of the interventions taken falls outside the scope of this report but Crosby (1976) provides an 
excellent account of the actions taken in the US to deal with the devastating pandemic. 
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Scientific understanding of viruses grew significantly during the interwar period. The 
influenza virus was finally isolated in 1933 (Garrett, 2005). In 1944 the first vaccine trials 
were conducted, and by June 1, 1945, 3 million doses had been administered to US Army 
personnel. The Army pioneered mass vaccinations within its ranks to prevent losses such as 
those seen in 1918 (Woodward, 1994). This was the first example of the use of mass 
procurement as a policy to limit the spread of influenza in the US. 
In 1957, a flu strain originating in China reached the US The disease proved most lethal in the 
old and young populations; US flu deaths were estimated at 80,000 (Potter, 2001). A slightly 
milder strain, Hong Kong flu, subsequently killed 34,000 people in the US during the 1968-69 
flu season (NAIAD, 2006). The total cost of these pandemics was ~$40 billion in 2006 dollars 
(Strikas, Wallace & Myers, 2002). Surprisingly, “In both 1957 and 1968, the first wave of the 
impending pandemic was detected some months before it struck the United States.” 
(Silverstein, 1981, p.20) Although public health officials monitored the situation and urged the 
mass production of vaccines, companies were hesitant to increase production following 
several years of low demand prior to the pandemic (Silverstein, 1981). Unfortunately, 
according to Silverstein, “the time did not seem socially ripe for such large-scale government 
involvement” (p.21) and Congress was concerned about bypassing the private health care 
system lest they be accused of “socialized medicine.” Silverstein also notes that the vaccines 
that were produced were distributed in a highly inequitable manner with large geographic 
variations in availability and rumors of corporations buying large stocks. The challenges 
observed during the 1957 pandemic highlight the importance of cooperation between the 
public and private sectors in pandemic response. 
 
The government responded swiftly to next influenza pandemic scare in 1976, known as the 
Swine Flu outbreak. Following the death of Army Private David Lewis in 1976, medical 
determined that the soldier had been infected with influenza that had mutated from pigs2. 
Fearing a repeat of the 1918 flu pandemic, President Ford announced on national television 
that he was appropriating $135 million ($478 million in 2006 dollars) to produce enough 
vaccine to inoculate every American (Garrett, 2005). Given the short production window 
mandated by the government, producers insisted on liability protection. To ensure the 
production of an adequate supply of vaccines, the government granted manufacturers this 
protection (Silverstein, 1981). Ultimately, Swine flu never caused a pandemic. However, the 
vaccine had deleterious side effects, in some cases causing Guillian-Barré Syndrome (GBS). 
GBS is a paralytic nerve disease, akin to Polio, that can lead to death (Silverstein, 1981). Over 
4 million Americans had been vaccinated before the program was halted. Twenty-five people 
died from the side effects of the vaccine and thousands of compensation claims were filed 
against the government. The government ended up paying damages of $90 million to those 
harmed by the vaccine (Garrett, 2005). The Swine Flu response was perceived as an appalling 
failure. The rapid increase in vaccine production and subsequent side effects illustrate the 
tradeoffs involved in the provision of liability protection to vaccine manufacturers.  
                                                 
2 Swine are thought to be key in aiding the transmission of influenza from birds to humans. The 1918 strain 
also mutated from Swine. 
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The Emergence of a New Pandemic Threat 
The first recorded case of H5N1 in humans occurred in 1997 in Hong Kong (FAO, 2006). As 
of November 29, 2006 154 people have died worldwide from H5N1 (WHO, Nov 2006), and 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that 220 
million birds have been culled in Asia alone to control the disease (FAO, 2006). As shown in 
Table 1 confirmed human cases of AI have been reported in Asia and the Middle East, and 
animal cases have been reported in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the US (WHO, 
Feb 2006). Figure 1 shows the United States Agency for International Development’s 
(USAID) predicted level of risk faced by countries throughout the world to H5N1. The virus is 
endemic in China and several other countries in Southeast Asia. In addition, the Western 
Hemisphere faces a pandemic risk.  
2003 2004 2005 2006 Total Country 
 Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 5 8 5 
Cambodia 0 0 0 0 4 4 2 2 6 6 
China 1 1 0 0 8 5 12 8 21 14 
Djibouti 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 7 15 7 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 19 12 55 45 74 57 
Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 2 
Thailand 0 0 17 12 5 2 3 3 25 17 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 4 12 4 
Viet Nam 3 3 29 20 61 19 0 0 93 42 
Total 4 4 46 32 97 42 111 76 258 154 
Table 1: Confirmed human cases of avian influenza as of November 29, 2006 (WHO, Nov 2006) 3 
 
Figure 1: Global risk map for avian influenza (USAID, 2006) 
                                                 
3 Total number of cases includes number of deaths. WHO reports only laboratory-confirmed cases 
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Given the pandemic virus has yet to emerge in humans, agencies are only able to loosely 
predict the likely impact of the disease.  
Figure 2 illustrates the estimates developed by the US Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) based on data from past pandemics. They assume that outbreaks will occur 
nationwide simultaneously or near-simultaneously. 
 
Figure 2: HHS estimates of various pandemic influenza scenarios (HHS, 2005) 
The potential economic costs of an influenza pandemic are high: a 2006 Asian Development 
Bank study predicts that an AI pandemic in livestock would lead to economic recession 
costing Asia US $297 billion per year (2006). For this reason, some Asian countries have been 
known to withhold information on H5N1 outbreaks when they occur, so as to prevent negative 
economic consequences (Elegant, 2004). 
H5N1 has resulted in near 100% mortality rates in birds after onset of severe symptoms. 
Although it can infect all birds, domesticated birds such as chickens seem especially 
vulnerable while wild birds have been observed to carry H5N1 without signs of harm (WHO, 
Feb 2006). According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), strain H5N1 has not been 
observed in the US, but other strains of avian influenza have (Aug 2006).  
Given the virulence observed in poultry populations, H5N1 is of particular concern as it 
satisfies all the characteristics of a pandemic strain except the ability to transmit between 
humans (WHO, Feb 2006). Influenza viruses are worrisome because of their ability to change 
over time to forms readily transmitted among humans. To date, only very limited human to 
human transmission of H5N1 has been observed (OSHA, 2006). Most human infections have 
occurred through contact with infected poultry.  
US Response to Current Threat 
Fear of a global pandemic has prompted governments and private industry alike to devote 
resources to the design and implementation of pandemic mitigation strategies. In December 
2005, the US Congress appropriated $3.8 billion as the first installment of a $7.1 billion 
request by President Bush for emergency funding for the National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza, published in November 2005 (Gellin, 2006). As shown in Figure 3, a majority of 
the funding has been directed toward efforts at procuring vaccines and antiviral drugs.  
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Figure 3: Breakdown of emergency funding requested by President Bush in November 20054 
The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza states its purpose as “(1) stopping, slowing or 
otherwise limiting the spread of a pandemic to the United States; (2) limiting the domestic 
spread of a pandemic, and mitigating disease, suffering and death; and (3) sustaining 
infrastructure and mitigating impact to the economy and the functioning of society.” (HSC, 
2005) 
In order to accomplish these goals the government is focusing on three key areas (HSC, 2005):  
• “Preparedness and Communication: Activities that should be undertaken before a 
pandemic to ensure preparedness, and the communication of roles and responsibilities to 
all levels of government, segments of society and individuals.  
• Surveillance and Detection: Domestic and international systems that provide continuous 
‘situational awareness,’ to ensure the earliest warning possible to protect the population.  
• Response and Containment: Actions to limit the spread of the outbreak and to 
mitigate the health, social and economic impacts of a pandemic.” 
 
These three areas are translated into a National Strategic Implementation Plan that 
distributes specific responsibilities among many different government agencies.  
Error! Reference source not found. shows the diversity of government agencies responsible 
for pandemic preparedness. 5 Furthermore, every state has a local implementation plan. 
                                                 
4 Graphic by authors, data sources: (All Things Considered, 2005) and (USDA, 2006) 
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Beyond this, the government has also provided advice for individuals, schools, businesses, 
communities and health care providers to try and enable all channels to be prepared. For 
example, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has a comprehensive plan to deal with 
pandemic influenza. Specific efforts include stockpiling facemasks, encouraging use of 
seasonal flu vaccines, and promoting hygiene, as well as preparing for supply chain 
disruptions. (Friscino, D, Interview with authors, Nov 2006) 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Organizational Chart (United States Government Manual, 2006) with annotations by authors 
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Figure 4: Federal responsibilities for avian influenza on organizational chart
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Avian Flu Technologies 
A wide range of state and federal government agencies, and private industries, are engaged in 
efforts to limit the impact of an avian influenza pandemic on the US. In the various phases of 
the pandemic, different technologies will be most relevant. However, it is important to 
consider these technologies in the context of the evolution of a global pandemic. Stepping 
back to consider a holistic view of the set of technologies as part of a greater system, the 
committee developed a technology mapping framework.  
Technology Map Framework 
The technology map illustrated in Figure 5 allowed us to understand the various 
interdependencies between technologies and the relative importance of these technologies in 
each phase. 
 
Figure 5: Avian influenza technology options map 
The vertical axis on the technology map consists of seven phases of a pandemic. These phases 
are: limited animal outbreaks, animal-animal transmission, major animal outbreaks, animal-
human transmission, limited human outbreaks, human-human transmission, and major human 
outbreaks. We are using these phases as a rough indication of the development of a pandemic 
and acknowledge that transitions from one phase to another will not be straightforward and 
clear.  
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In addition, it is important to note that different geographical regions are likely to experience 
each individual phase of a pandemic at different times. Geographically dispersed 
organizations should be prepared to react to different phases of the pandemic concurrently. In 
addition, the unpredictable nature of the evolution of influenza viruses makes it likely that the 
pandemic will not follow each phase in a neat linear order. Widespread human-human 
transmission certainly could occur before widespread animal-human transmission. However, 
the occurrence of each phase makes the next phase moving up the vertical axis more likely.  
The horizontal axis represents six different types of actions that can be taken during each 
phase of an emerging pandemic including detection, observation, containment, treatment, and 
prevention. Detection refers to those actions that initially identify an emergent virus and can 
be used to determine which phase of the pandemic the disease is currently in. Our use of 
detection refers to actions that consider entire populations on a local or regional scale. 
Observation refers to actions that determine whether or not the disease has infected individuals 
and how those individuals are reacting to the disease. Containment actions are those that seek 
to limit the spread or escalation of the disease once it has been observed in individual patients 
or patient populations. Treatment refers to actions aimed at reacting to infection and helping 
individuals recover from the disease. Finally, prevention encompasses those actions taken in 
order to either prevent the disease from reaching later phases or preventing future pandemics 
from emerging. This definition of prevention takes into account that the virus has already 
emerged, and thus preventing the disease altogether is no longer possible.  
The technologies included on the map were derived from an extensive literature review and 
from feedback provided by experts throughout the field of pandemic preparedness. The 
committee placed each technology on the map only after a consensus was reached concerning 
its most suitable place. In the sections that follow we briefly discuss all of the technologies and 
explain their specific placements on the map. 
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Diagnosis of Influenza 
A range of methods can be used to diagnose influenza in patients. The most rudimentary of 
these involves diagnosing patients based on their presenting symptoms. While this is likely to 
be used during a pandemic, it is relevant to procurement policy, and hence is not discussed 
here. The methods differ in the amount of time required, the sophistication of the lab facilities 
needed, and their sensitivity. Gavin and Thompson (2003) have classified the tests into four 
broad categories based on how the virus is detected: serology, virus culture, nucleic acid, and 
antigen. 
Laboratory Tests 
Serology, the measurement and 
characterization of antibodies and other 
immunological substances in body fluids, is 
primarily used for epidemiological or 
research purposes. Serology requires 
samples to be collected over two to four 
weeks, extensive laboratory facilities, and 
trained personnel. (Gavin & Thomson, 
2003). These requirements limit its 
applicability for use with patients in a 
pandemic situation.  
Laboratory culturing of viruses is often referred to as the “gold standard” of diagnostic tests. 
The tests are critical in monitoring circulating influenza strains due to their ability to determine 
exact virus subtypes with high accuracy. Detection by virus cultures requires less time than 
serology, with results typically available within 4-5 days. However, similar to serology, the 
tests require extensive laboratory facilities and trained clinicians. This limits the applicability 
of this technique in pandemic emergencies. Laboratory tests have been sped up by the use of 
rapid culture techniques. These new processes give results in 1-3 days after inoculation, 
making it faster but at the cost of lower accuracy than the conventional method (Gavin & 
Thomson, 2003).  
Even faster than serology and the culturing of viruses is the detection of viral nucleic acid by 
such methods as polymerase chain reactions and the use of gene arrays6. The processes have a 
1-2 day delay before results are available. Microarrays offer the promise of rapid and accurate 
detection and subtyping of respiratory viruses, including influenza, in individual patients or as 
part of large scale-surveillance (Gavin & Thomson, 2003). However, the methods still require 
extensive laboratory equipment and trained technicians.  
The final method used to diagnose influenza is to detect virus antigens. Several methods exist 
to detect virus antigens. One method, Direct Fluorescent Antibody staining (DFA), involves 
                                                 
6 Polymerase chain reaction methods use primers - nucleic acid strands or related molecules that serve as starting points 
for DNA replication (“Primer”, 2006) - to detect and sub-type influenza viruses. DNA microarrays use labeled DNA or 
RNA sequence to detect the presence of a complementary sequence by hybridization with a nucleic acid sample. 
(“Reverse transcription”, 2006). 
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tagging antibodies with fluorescent compounds. The antibodies glow under UV light and can 
therefore be detected when they attach to a certain virus. This test is typically offered as a 
“same-day” test as it takes about 24 hours to perform. The use of enzyme immunoassays and 
optical immunoassays are similar methods. Rapid enzyme immunoassays use enzymes to 
label the antibodies instead of fluorescent compounds. Optical immunoassays label antibodies 
by detecting their reflection of light (Harbeck, Teague, Crossen, Maul & Childers, 1993). 
The long timeframes, expensive laboratory facilities, and highly trained technicians required 
by the diagnosis methods discussed above limit their practically in a pandemic emergency. For 
these reasons, these technologies are more appropriately used as detection mechanisms to 
follow the diseases evolution on a large scale. They would not be helpful in identifying H5N1 
in individual patients as a guide to treatment options. On our map, these techniques can be 
found in the detection column with applicability to all phases of a pandemic.  
Rapid Diagnostic Tests 
Several rapid diagnostic tests which are also 
based on the detection of virus antigens are 
currently on the market. These tests are all 
designed as single-use and are designed to 
detect influenza virus within 30 minutes of 
inoculation time. However, these tests are 
somewhat expensive for widespread use in a 
pandemic emergency.7 
Although the tests have been proven to 
detect H5N1, no rapid flu test currently on 
the market can differentiate it from other subtypes. In addition, a negative result using a rapid 
test does not rule out avian flu entirely. This fact led Singer (2005) to conclude that rapid tests 
are important for determining appropriate antiviral drugs, for isolating patients, and for 
informing health authorities but that surveillance of H5N1 using rapid tests is “never 
acceptable.” Weinberg and Walker (2005) reached similar conclusions after evaluating three 
rapid immunoassay diagnostic kits, claiming the low sensitivities made them useful only as 
“screening tools” (p 367). 
Government-funded research has led to the development of a new rapid test based on gene 
arrays, representing an important advance in this technology. Two products developed by a 
team at University of Colorado at Boulder and CDC, MChip and its predecessor FluChip can 
rapidly identify multiple H5N1 subtypes. MChip represents a significant advance from 
FluChip in that it is based on a single gene segment (the “M” segment) that mutates much less 
frequently than the HA and NA segments. This implies that the test would need to be updated 
less frequently as the virus evolves (Pellerin, 2006).  
Rapid diagnostic tests eliminate many of the challenges facing the more traditional diagnosis 
methods. These tests could be used on a wide enough scale to be useful as 
                                                 
7 $429 for 25 Quick Vue tests (from http://www.cliawave.com) 
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observation/diagnosis tools for individual patients. The results of these tests will be available 
in a short enough timeframe to inform treatment decisions. On the technology map, rapid 
diagnostic tests are located in the observation column spanning from animal-human 
transmission through major human outbreaks. The use of these tests on animals is restricted 
due to their expense. 
Vaccination 
Vaccination has traditionally been used to 
produce immunity against viruses. When 
they work, they are excellent in preventing 
disease, and diseases such as Polio have 
been virtually eradicated due to vaccines. 
The goal of vaccination, particularly in the 
event of a potential pandemic, is to produce 
an immune response with the lowest 
quantity of antigen possible, and avoiding 
the need for additional rounds of injection. 
The principle driving creation of a vaccine for AI is the generation of antibodies directed 
against hemagglutinin (HA), the surface protein that binds to the cells of infected individuals. 
Successful vaccine development requires that researchers identify and recreate the subtypes of 
two of the virus’s surface proteins HA and neuraminidase (NA) (Hood, 2006). These two 
proteins are responsible for the strength and transmissibility of the virus.  
Vaccines could be a powerful tool to limit the spread of a pandemic and could also be used to 
prevent the resurgence of the virus. Therefore, vaccines are located in the containment and 
prevention columns of the technology map. 
Animal Vaccination 
Vaccine technology for animals tends to be similar to the technologies for human vaccines, 
discussed in the next section, though it is subject to far less standardization (Capua & 
Marangon, 2006). Historically, animal vaccination efforts have not focused on AI because 
infection with AI viruses tends to occur less frequently than other viruses against which the 
agricultural sector tends to vaccinate. The recent outbreaks, however, have provided 
momentum for the development of AI vaccines for poultry. The first vaccines became 
available in 2004.  
China began a program of vaccinating commercial poultry in 2004, and as of mid-2005 had 
not seen any additional outbreaks in these birds (Webster & Hulse 2005). Thailand has begun 
investigating vaccination of backyard poultry and free-range ducks, and Vietnam began 
testing poultry vaccines in 2005. Webster and Hulse note that animal vaccines currently raise 
two primary concerns. First, agricultural vaccines vary in quality: there are “good” and “bad” 
agricultural vaccines. Good vaccines will provide protection from disease symptoms and 
reduce virus load in the individual below what is necessary for transmission. Bad vaccines 
might limit the appearance of disease symptoms but not excretion, and thus, transmission, of 
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the virus. Second, animal vaccines may promote mutation of the virus, maintaining the risk of 
infection in the vaccinated species or in others. With this in mind, Webster and Hulse (2005) 
note that culling has remained the preferred option for controlling the virus for many health 
professionals. In addition, they note that the resurgence of AI in Indonesian poultry and pigs 
and in live poultry markets in China suggests that vaccines of insufficient quality may have 
been used to some extent in these countries.  
Human Vaccination 
While vaccination has been an important part of the strategy to control animal outbreaks, there 
is no commercially available AI vaccine for humans. Research efforts, however, have been 
ongoing. Monto (2006) notes a number of the challenges pertaining to vaccine development in 
the specific context of avian flu. One is the ability to gauge the extent to which a particular 
vaccine produces a sufficient antibody response to guarantee immunity. Monto (2006) notes 
that vaccine research on other types of avian influenza has not resulted in sufficient antibody 
response, suggesting that multiple doses and the use of adjuvants8 would be required. Further, 
evaluating the meaning of response to tested avian flu vaccines has been difficult in practice, 
requiring additional testing. Similarly, Luke and Subbarao (2006) note that despite the 
advances made since the first appearance of H5N1 AI viruses in 1997, many gaps remain in 
the understanding of immune response to AI. Table 2 summarizes our current state of 
knowledge on pandemic influenza vaccine development.  
 
Table 2: Current knowledge on pandemic influenza vaccines development (Luke & Subbarao, 2006) 
Methods of vaccine production have changed little over time. Many vaccines are still 
manufactured by replication of inactivated virus strains in poultry eggs. However, this process 
is both time and labor-intensive, requiring millions of eggs and several months lead time for 
vaccine development. As a result, the pandemic threat has generated increased interest in the 
development of cell-based vaccine production technologies, which promise much greater 
yield. (Ulmer, Valley, Rappouldi, 2006)  
The majority of recent research has focused on the further development of reverse genetics for 
vaccine production. In particular, research involving plasmid-based reverse genetics has 
shown promising results. With reverse genetics, researchers splice genes from both a harmless 
strain of the virus with strong reproductive potential and the HA and NA genes from the 
virulent strain, though the dangerous part of these genes is removed. These pieces of DNA are 
called plasmids, and these plasmids can then be entered into animal cells in order to generate 
the seed virus (Hood, 2006).  
                                                 
8 Adjuvants are agents which modify the effect of other agents while having few if any direct effects when given by 
themselves. In this sense, they are very roughly analogous with chemical catalysts. (“Adjuvant”, 2006) 
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In addition, research conducted by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
(NIAID) has focused on live attenuated cold-adapted influenza virus vaccines used in concert 
with plasmid-based reverse genetics. Cold-adapted vaccines are created from a virus modified 
to replicate efficiently only at low temperatures. The use of live rather than inactivated viruses 
has advantages for populations that have not yet been exposed to the virus, including the 
generation of higher levels of antibody and also cellular and mucosal immunity, which could 
ultimately protect against a number of different strains (Schultz-Cherry & McCullers, 2006). 
In addition, attenuated vaccines generate rapid immunity, generally within 10 days of 
inoculation. The goal of this research program is the development of test vaccines based on 
existing strains of the AI virus (Luke & Subbarao, 2006). 
One concern with using an attenuated AI vaccine is the possibility that the vaccine virus could 
reassort with an influenza virus in circulation, resulting in a novel influenza subtype that could 
spread among the population. Luke and Subbarao (2006) caution that this risk must be 
considered by public health officials in deciding to introduce an attenuated vaccine for public 
use.  
While currently it is impossible to know which specific variant of AI will lead to a pandemic, 
identification of this virus at the start of the pandemic will provide information for the course 
of vaccine development. Depending on how the virus has evolved vaccines made from other 
variants of AI may or may not be effective in generating immunity, and vaccine development 
would then commence with identification of the novel virus. Vaccine creation would then 
require manipulation of the pandemic virus for vaccine production, in order to reduce 
pathogenicity and improve reproductive yield. 
Monto (2006) emphasizes the importance of strategy in maximizing the benefits of vaccine 
use in addressing an AI pandemic. For example, while it is possible that use of genetic 
material from viruses similar to the pandemic virus could be stockpiled and combined with 
material from the pandemic virus in vaccine use, this genetic material might be used more 
effectively in vaccines for use before the onset of a pandemic. Although AI has continued to 
evolve, it is possible that a vaccine that does not exactly match it could provide some 
protection, or reduce the dose of a matching vaccine that is developed after a pandemic begins.  
Antiviral Drugs 
In the absence of a vaccine for AI, antiviral 
drugs could be used for containment of 
human avian flu outbreaks and reduction of 
overall medical and economic costs. These 
drugs work either by preventing the release 
of viruses from cells (M2 channel 
inhibitors) or preventing viral replication 
within cells (NA inhibitors). Democratis, 
Pareek and Stephenson (2006) note that use 
of M2 channel inhibitors for treatment of 
influenza is limited because of their toxicity 
and problems with drug resistance. According to CDC, two M2 channel inhibitors used for 
A V I A N  I N F L U E N Z A  T E C H N O L O G I E S  
23 
treatment of influenza, amantadine and rimantadine, have not been effective in treating human 
cases of avian influenza in Asia. CDC suggests that two NA inhibitors, Tamiflu (oseltamivir) 
and Relenza (zanamivir) may work to treat avian flu, but further study on their effectiveness is 
needed. NA inhibitors work by binding to the active site on the viral NA, inhibiting viral 
replication and the virus’s ability to spread. Because pandemic AI is likely to be a systemic 
infection, Tamiflu is considered the antiviral drug most likely to be effective in treating avian 
flu, because, unlike other existing antivirals, it can be absorbed throughout the system. 
However, Relenza, with which absorption is limited to the respiratory tract, could play an 
important role in prevention, because infection is likely to occur via that route (Democratis et 
al, 2006).  
One company, BioCryst, has seen promising results with an injectable antiviral drug called 
Peramivir for treating both seasonal and avian influenza.9 BioCryst (2006) also notes that the 
drug was given fast-track status for approval by the FDA in 2005. Testing is also expected to 
take place in Vietnam and Thailand (Roos, Oct 2006). If the drug proves to be successful, one 
important implication is the possibility that the drug can be manufactured more quickly 
relative to other antivirals. BioCryst’s chairman recently suggested that one Swiss 
manufacturer could produce one metric ton of the drug within a month, which he suggested 
could treat about 8 million people (Roos, Oct 2006). In addition, Democratis et al (2006) 
noted that Peramivir has shown some potential to inhibit viral strains that have shown 
resistance to Tamiflu and Relenza.  
Antiviral drugs will be most effective in treating individuals who have already contracted the 
disease. However, since antivirals slow the replication of influenza viruses they may also be 
helpful in containing the disease and in prevention. Therefore, antivirals cover all of the 
treatment column and stretch into both the prevention and containment columns on the 
technology map. 
Facemasks 
Facemasks could limit the extent of 
transmission of AI by providing a physical 
barrier against transmission, though they are 
typically viewed as a last resort strategy 
(IOM, 2006). Facemasks come in two 
forms: respirators, which are fitted masks 
designed to protect the user from inhalation 
of contaminants; and medical masks, which 
are unfitted masks designed to protect the 
user against potentially infectious body 
fluids. Because respirators protect against 
inhalation risks, they are believed to be more effective than medical masks in protecting 
against airborne transmission of disease. The most common type of disposable respirators are 
                                                 
9 Peramivir was found to improve survival of mice and ferrets infected with AI, and clinical testing in humans has 
found that high blood levels of the drug can be given in humans without causing any adverse effects (BioCryst, 2006). 
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N95 filtering facepiece respirators, which are so named because they exhibit a 95% efficiency 
in filtering out particles greater than 0.3 microns in diameter10.  
A recent Institute of Medicine (IOM) study (2006) assessed the potential for the development 
of disposable N95 respirators in healthcare settings. In addition, the study assessed the current 
state of knowledge on the need for reusable facemasks for healthcare providers and the public. 
The report was motivated by the likelihood that in a near-term pandemic, disposable respirator 
and facemask supplies would likely be insufficient.  
The IOM committee was unable to identify modifications to facemask or respirator 
manufacturing that would make them suitable for reuse. The committee was also unable to 
assess the effectiveness of woven cloth masks that have been used in Asia during AI 
outbreaks, and notes that while there is not sufficient information to recommend or discourage 
their use; they are unlikely to provide the same level of protection as medical masks or 
respirators. In addition, the committee warns that use of such devices might provide a false 
sense of security and encourage less caution in preventing exposure in those wearing them.  
Overall, the IOM committee recommended that HHS pursue further research on transmission 
of infectious diseases in general, and, more specifically, on the epidemiological aspects of 
novel influenza strains and the design and development of reusable respirators and medical 
masks. This would include research on new materials that might further enhance effectiveness, 
including innovations targeted at the cloth face masks that are prevalent in Asia. In addition, 
the committee notes that an important aspect such research is the development of 
decontamination techniques that would not cause harm to users of the mask and would retain 
the mask’s integrity and performance. Finally, the committee noted that regardless of the 
quality of respirators and facemasks, their effectiveness depends on proper usage - particularly 
mask fit and need for hand hygiene after handling the mask - and that public health education 
should stress this point.  
Facemasks are best used as a tool for containment of the virus. While they have no relevance 
in the early phases of the pandemic before humans can contract the diseases, they are still 
likely to be requested by those working around animals as a precaution. For this reason, we 
have placed facemasks under the containment spanning all of the pandemic phases.  
                                                 
10 Further information on N95 disposable respirators can be found at 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/idepc/dtopics/infectioncontrol/ppe/comp/n95.html 
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Ventilators 
Ventilators will be an important 
technology for treatment of some patients 
with AI. Mechanical ventilation can be 
used to support life in patients suffering 
from acute respiratory failure by moving 
air into and out of their lungs until they 
regain the ability to breathe 
independently. A ventilator takes oxygen 
and air from a building supply or tank, 
pressurizes the gas and blends it to the 
desired oxygen level, and ultimately 
delivers it to the patient. A respiratory therapist determines the appropriate magnitude, 
rate, and duration of flow.  
The FDA classifies ventilators into three groups: hospital, transport, and home-use. 
Hospital units offer many monitoring features and cost $15,000 to $35,000 each. 
Transport (or portable) ventilator units cost between $5,000 and $12,000 per unit. They 
offer full ventilation capabilities but fewer monitoring features than hospital ventilators. 
Home-use ventilators cost several hundred dollars, and offer the least monitoring features 
(Kurtzweil, 1999).  
Experts expect a shortage of mechanical ventilators if a human AI pandemic hits. In 
March 2006, there were 105,000 ventilators in the country, and HHS estimates a need of 
between 64,875 and 742,500 in varying pandemic scenarios (as shown in Figure 2 pg 12). 
Currently, 100,000 ventilators are used during regular flu seasons. The Strategic National 
Stockpile holds 4,000 to 5,000 portable ventilators (McNeil, 2006).  
As a critical piece of hospital equipment, in the event of a pandemic, ventilators will be 
used solely for the treatment of individuals with the disease. Ventilators are found in the 
treatment column of the technology map.
A N A L Y S I S  O F  P R O C U R E M E N T  S T R A T E G I E S  
26 
Analysis of Procurement 
Strategies 
The markets for the technologies relevant to avian influenza vary significantly in terms of their 
competitiveness, cost to entry, regulatory environment, and excess capacity in the industry, 
among other factors. However, several themes can be highlighted to understand market 
efficiencies and the barriers to pandemic preparedness. The pre-pandemic procurement of 
each of these technologies faces unique challenges but policy solutions can be used to bring 
about change and we have used our technologies unique characteristics to highlight this.  
Upon the emergence of a pandemic virus, immediate demand surges can be expected. 
Anticipating shortages, governments have already begun to stockpile key technologies such as 
anitivirals and facemasks. However, even with adequate funds for purchasing supplies, market 
conditions will render some technologies unavailable without other government interventions. 
Government procurement can improve the supply of technologies needed for pandemic 
response. The ability of the government to procure pre-pandemic supplies of technologies, and 
the urgency for doing so, depends heavily on the market conditions for each technology. 
It is worth repeating that the scope of this report is restricted to procurement of technologies 
limiting the effects of a human pandemic specifically. Therefore, our analysis of procurement 
is limited to the critical technologies targeted for humans. 
Markets and the Technology Map 
In looking holistically at the set of technologies discussed in our preceeding technologies 
section, we observed that technologies found on the left side of our technology map are less 
likely to be adequately supplied by the market. Government pre-pandemic preparations will be 
especially important for these technologies, targeting the containment, treatment, and/or 
prevention of pandemic influenza in humans. These technologies include vaccines, antiviral 
drugs, facemasks, and ventilators.  
In contrast, we found that technologies on the right side of the map would generally be 
provided by the market in adequate supply. Procurement of these technologies is less relevant 
to pre-pandemic preparedness as they have only minimal roles in emergency response 
(Friscino, D, Interview with authors, Nov 2006). This distinction is illustrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Technology Map with Market Distinctions 
 
Pandemic readiness 
Industries currently experiencing rapid demand growth are the most likely to be able to 
respond to the demand surges inherent to pandemic response. In general, these industries can 
be characterized by competitiveness, diversity of products, and expanding capacity. Of the 
technologies we analyzed, rapid diagnostic tests and ventilators both exhibit these 
characteristics. Pandemic readiness does not imply that supplies of these technologies are 
currently sufficient; rather, it implies an ability to increase output with minimal government 
intervention.  
Competitiveness 
A competitive market is a market with many producers that provides incentives for efficient 
production, innovation, and declining costs. Both the ventilator and rapid diagnostics markets 
exhibit these qualities.  
First, the market for ventilators remains highly competitive, with innovation and growth 
increasing primarily as a result of the increasingly wealthy and aging population’s trend 
toward home health care (Frost & Sullivan, 2005). While the market for ventilators has 
traditionally been driven by replacement of existing equipment, recent growth has been fueled 
by increased demand for portable and home use ventilators. Ventworld, an internet 
Technologies which are likely to be well provided by the market are denoted in grey boxes.  While 
technologies which have barriers to pandemic readiness are marked in blue. 
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marketplace for mechanical ventilation products, lists more than 100 manufacturers of 
mechanical ventilators. 11  
Second, the production of rapid diagnostic tests lies within the rapidly expanding and 
highly competitive biotechnology sector. The competitive nature of the market has been 
an asset for the development of rapid diagnostic tests for avian flu. In fact, biotechnology 
companies have already developed several profitable technologies that are aiding the 
development of rapid diagnostic tests.  
The WHO's recommendations of July 2005 on the use of rapid testing for influenza list 
19 commercially available diagnostic tests (WHO, 2005). This indicates that conditions 
for competitive production and development of diagnostic tests are in place (Berndt E, 
Interview with authors, Nov 2006). In addition, several new tests are in varying stages of 
the FDA approval processes (Park, 2006). FDA approval of multiple tests would increase 
competition in the market for avian flu detection, leading to improvements in test 
sensitivity, specificity, and lower costs.  
Diversified markets 
Rapid demand growth and competition commonly result in product diversity, a second 
important market characteristic for pandemic preparedness. The presence of diverse products 
within a single technology market implies numerous sources of supply as well as flexibility in 
product choice.  
A primary reason for the diversified markets we observed was the presence of existing and 
varied demand for products in the absence of avian flu. For example, rapid diagnostic 
technologies have many applications in medicine beyond AI.  
The following advances cited by Park (2006) exemplify the level and variety of innovation 
that is occurring within the industry. For example, CombiMatrix, a company in Washington 
state, launched a DNA microarray that can detect and identify a number of different flu 
strains, including H5N1. Tm Bioscience, a Toronto-based company, has developed a test that 
can detect all major human respiratory viruses, including H5N1, and is currently working with 
FDA on gaining expedited review. Genaco Biomedical Products, based in Alabama, already 
has a commercially based test that can detect all known avian influenza strains, as well as 20 
other respiratory ailments, and identify the virus within 4 hours using polymerase chain 
reaction techniques. (Seigenthaler Public Relations, 2005). As the virus evolves diagnostic 
tests will have to be updated in order to be able to identify the latest H5N1 subtype.  
The ventilator market is also characterized by significant product diversity. Beyond the 
$30,000 hospital ventilators, governments have the possibility of procuring portable 
ventilators for less than half of that cost, or smaller ventilators such as those used in homes for 
a few hundred dollars (McNeil, 2006). While features vary among these products, the 
possibility of procuring different models provides important options to policymakers facing 
preparedness decisions with limited time and resources.  
                                                 
11 See www.ventworld.com  
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Manufacturing capacity 
The availability of excess capacity is essential to a technology being able to deal with a 
pandemic. This characteristic is generally most common in industries experiencing rapid 
growth. In addition, it is important to consider the ease with which industries can expand 
capacity given a rapid demand surge.  
The ventilator industry currently has excess capacity. A representative for Drager Medical, a 
German company that leads the world in ventilator production, noted that given sufficient 
demand, the company could double manufacturing capacity over the course of a week, 
providing an additional 10,000 ventilators in a year (McNeil, 2006). Given this fact and the 
large number of manufacturers on the market, it appears feasible that the US could 
significantly increase the quantity of available ventilators over the next several years in the 
absence of a pandemic. Of course, this expansion would not happen without large purchases 
for stockpiles. 
In addition, with rapid growth in the diagnostics market, evidence suggests that most 
companies specializing in diagnostics are planning increases in manufacturing capacity. While 
we were unable to locate estimates of projected and planned capacity increases, a recent 
survey of biomedical companies in California found that more than 70% of companies 
expected to expand their manufacturing capacity within the US in the next two years 
(California Health Care Institute, 2006). While this data represents only California companies, 
it suggests a trend that bodes well for the ability of the US to manufacture diagnostic tests in 
the event of a pandemic. 
Barriers to pandemic readiness 
With the exception of vaccines, all the technologies on the left side of our map (those shown 
in blue in Figure 6) exist in the market but are unable to meet the high demand associated with 
a pandemic. Vaccines also suffer from a lack of manufacturing capacity, but significant other 
factors compound the problem. These include poor historical government interventions, as 
well as the fact that vaccines cannot be produced until the pandemic strain has emerged. Box 1 
details the decline of US vaccine manufacturing capability. 
Demand uncertainty 
Demand uncertainty reduces the incentives of individual companies to invest in research and 
development. This is an acute problem in the case of pandemic influenza vaccine 
development. 
In addition, demand uncertainty limits the incentives companies have to invest capital towards 
new manufacturing facilities that may not ultimately be needed. In the case of vaccines, new 
manufacturing plants can require four years of lead time and hundreds of millions of dollars of 
capital investment (Daems, Del Guidice, Rappouli, 2005). Such an investment can only be 
justified by forecasted long-term demand. Similar circumstances have negatively influenced 
the development and availability of new antivirals. 
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Cost of entry  
Developing and manufacturing some technologies, such as vaccines and antivirals, requires 
huge capital investments, with an uncertain payoff that at best will occur many years in the 
future. For example, in the vaccine market, companies must finish building the full 
manufacturing facility for a vaccine before the FDA approves phase III clinical trials—a 
process that typically costs $30 million (Grabowski & Vernon, 1997; IOM, 2003). Even a 
foreign pharmaceutical company with an approved, proven drug sold outside the US must 
perform full FDA clinical trials before it can sell that drug in the US (IOM, 2003). The high 
cost of entry may stifle innovation in these industries, as it prevents risk-taking by the big 
firms and prevents startups from entering the market. Government intervention to increase 
research and development in these industries is often beneficial, especially when public goods 
are involved. 
Lack of manufacturing capacity  
As mentioned previously, the availability of excess capacity is essential to a technology being 
available in the event of a pandemic. Unfortunately, key technologies such as vaccines, 
antivirals, and facemasks have insufficient capacity and little or no surge capacity. Moreover, 
domestic manufacturing capacity will be critical in the event of large scale international supply 
chain disruptions. 
Even if vaccine production plants operate 24 hours a day at full capacity, the supply of 
vaccines would still fall far short of the potential need, as shown in Table 3. Somewhat 
optimistically, the WHO estimates that by 2009, pandemic vaccine production could expand 
to only 2.3 billion doses for a world population of nearly 7 billion. Furthermore, it is possible 
that pandemic flu and seasonal flu vaccine production will compete for capacity 
simultaneously, reducing available capacity. (WHO, Sep 2006)  
Estimate of production capacity for current 
influenza vaccine: 
350 million doses (inactivated trivalent vaccine 
containing 15 ug of HA per dose). 
Estimate of production capacity for potential 
influenza vaccine, if manufacturers optimize 
current output (e.g. by working 3 shifts/24 hours): 
500 million doses (inactivated trivalent vaccine 
containing 15 ug of HA per dose). 
Planned expansion for extra vaccine production-
capacity in the next 2-3 years (280 million): 
780 million doses (inactivated trivalent vaccine 
containing 15 ug of HA per dose). 
Estimate if production should switch to 
monovalent pandemic influenza vaccine, 
assuming only 15ug per does (2009 projection): 
2340 million doses of pandemic vaccine 
(inactivated monovalent vaccine containing 15 ug 
of HA per dose). 
Table 3: Short-term potential availabilty of influenza vaccine per year (WHO, Sep 2006) 
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While the respirator market has some ability to respond successfully to demand surges, fear of 
pandemic flu has led governments, hospitals, and businesses to attempt to stockpile disposable 
respirators, causing production bottlenecks. For example, 3M plants are currently running at 
maximum capacity but the company has responded with increased investment in 
manufacturing capacity (DePass, 2006).  
While the US has three major producers of N95 respirators, additional competition exists from 
foreign companies, particularly in China. Chinese respirators became particularly important 
during the SARS outbreak in Canada, as businesses had difficulty acquiring facemasks 
produced by American companies. (Saunders, 2005). It is also important to consider that 
many US companies produce facemasks overseas. Osterholm (2005) notes that many mask 
components produced by US companies also come from overseas. He argues that in the event 
of a global pandemic that involves border closings, it may be impossible for US firms to 
produce facemasks. While there has been little focus on overseas inputs to critical 
technologies, supply chain disruptions will also likely have implications for other technologies 
(Osterholm M, Interview with authors, Nov 2006). 
Lack of diversity 
Product diversity helps to ensure availability and multiple technology options. Among the 
technologies the committee studied, the lack of diversity in the antivirals market is particularly 
worrisome. While Tamiflu capacity has expanded significantly, the possibility of antiviral 
resistance implies a need for greater product diversity in the antiviral market. Cases of 
antiviral resistance have been documented in Vietnam (Roos, 2005). However, Peramivir is 
the only new antiviral drug for avian influenza in clinical trials. The need for additional 
antiviral drugs suggests a role for government promotion of such development. 
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Box 1: The decline of US vaccine manufacturing 
Vaccine development is impeded by a number of factors. First, the costs of complying with 
FDA approval processes are high. Vaccines must meet stringent safety and efficacy 
standards before approval, and they are subject to review and licensing procedures that 
extend beyond those required for most pharmaceuticals. Each individual vaccine batch 
must be approved and licensed, and costs associated with each step of the regulatory 
process are high. For example, FDA requires that vaccines used in Phase III clinical trials 
be manufactured in a facility that will actually be used for production of the vaccine if it is 
improved. This implies that a company might spend on the order of $30 million on 
preparation of a production facility before a vaccine is granted approval (Grabowski and 
Vernon, 1997; IOM, 2003).  
Second, liability risks to vaccine companies are great. This is partially because vaccines are 
administered to healthy individuals, making any side-effects easily attributable. In addition, 
vaccines pose inherent risks even when properly manufactured. With any vaccine there is a 
small possibility of severe reaction or death (Riddiough and Williams, 1980). IOM (2003) 
notes that liability insurance costs were a primary reason for the mass exit of firms from the 
vaccine industry during the 1980s. While policy attempted to address these costs through 
creation of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program in 1988, the program 
covers specific side effects from a limited number of vaccines, and therefore does not 
include a new pandemic vaccine without an amendment to the original act.  
Third, government purchase programs, by placing downward pressure on vaccine prices, 
may have created disincentives for firms that supply vaccines. Government has historically 
been a major purchaser of vaccines, particularly for childhood vaccination programs. This 
has frequently been accomplished through low-bid contracts, limiting the price that 
manufacturers receive (IOM, 2003).  
Due to the reasons described above, the number of vaccine producers has fallen from 26 to 
4 during the period 1967-2002. (Graph derived from IOM, 2003) 
Decline in US vaccine manufacturers, 1967-2002
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Policy solutions and challenges 
A variety of policy solutions exist that reduce the barriers to pandemic preparedness. This 
section outlines a variety of policy solutions and some of the challenges to their 
implementation. Most of these policies are important to adopt in advance of the emergence of 
a pandemic. 
With the notable exception of vaccines, direct stockpiling of most technologies will facilitate 
the immediate response to an emerging pandemic. Direct procurement can be coupled with 
other policy mechanisms that promote private sector investment in technology development 
and ultimately, supply, by mitigating risk associated with product development or provision. 
These include the following: financial awards, advance purchase agreements, the subsidization 
of research and development, the extension of liability protections to some industries, and 
changes to regulatory approval process changes.  
It is important to note that the impacts of some of these policies may overlap with more direct 
procurement policies, and that redundancies and subsequent inefficiencies may occur when 
numerous policy tools are being used to the same end. For example, guaranteeing market 
demand through procurement could make R&D subsidies redundant. Research by Acemoglu 
and Linn (2004) suggests that increasing drug market size is associated with a significant 
increase in drug development efforts.  
The most appropriate policy selections depend on the specific characteristics of each 
technology. For example, when procurement is intended to create a new market for a non-
existent product, the government might provide a financial award for successful product 
development. Similarly, in procuring a technology that provides a public good but for which 
private demand is highly uncertain, government might guarantee procurement of a certain 
quantity (Rolfstam, 2005). 
Stockpiling 
Direct stockpiling of technologies is most effective for technologies that can already be 
manufactured in large quantities and can be stored inexpensively for a significant amount of 
time. With respect to avian influenza preparedness antivirals, facemasks, and ventilators 
appear to be good candidates for stockpiling. However, the cost of purchasing ventilators may 
prohibit widespread stockpiling. 
Shortages of antivirals are expected to persist despite planned increases in production capacity. 
Manufacturing of antiviral drugs requires significant lead times, and it therefore cannot be 
completed on-demand in response to a pandemic.12 The United States is currently creating a 
stockpile of 81 million doses of Tamiflu while the WHO is creating stockpiles of at least 5 
million courses of Tamiflu treatment for rapid delivery to the location of an emergent virus 
(Democratis et al, 2006).  
                                                 
12 According to Roche pharmaceuticals, average lead time for the Production of Tamiflu is on the order of 12 months. 
See http://www.roche.com/med-cor-2005-08-24.  
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Stockpiling can also provide powerful motivation for manufacturers to increase capacity. 
Since 2004, Roche, the producer of Tamiflu, has increased its production capacity 
dramatically as a result of increased demand from government stockpiling policies. Roche has 
granted licenses to a number of manufacturers for generic production in order to achieve this 
growth. Roche’s domestic capacity in the United States has increased to 80 million doses 
annually (Nutley, 2006). 
Stockpiling of disposable facemasks is also important. IOM (2006) noted that in the event of a 
pandemic, there will be inevitable shortages of disposable masks. Therefore, a large stockpile 
of disposable masks may be the only solution to providing healthcare workers and other at risk 
employees during a pandemic. The US has procured 150 million N95 respirators for the 
Strategic National Stockpile. (HSC, 2005) 
The major constraint to ventilator availability appears to result from challenges on the demand 
side. The estimated demand for ventilators in the event of a pandemic vastly exceeds current 
supply. As such, pre-pandemic stockpiling may be necessary. In March 2006, there were 
105,000 ventilators in the country (McNeil, 2006), and HHS estimates a need for 742,500 in a 
severe AI pandemic (See Figure 2 on pg 12). Standard hospital ventilators cost approximately 
$30,000 each. At that price, hospitals cannot afford to stockpile units that may ultimately 
never be used. Hospitals keep little if any reserve ventilator capacity on-site. Currently, 
100,000 ventilators are used during regular flu seasons. During peak flu season, many 
hospitals rent additional units in order to meet short-term spikes in demand. While portable 
ventilators can be purchased for about $6,000 each, Rubinson, Nazzo, Talmer, O’Toole and 
Kramer (2005) estimate that few hospitals can afford to double their capacity. As a result, it 
appears that the primary role of stockpiling hospital-quality ventilators will fall on the 
government. The Strategic National Stockpile currently holds 4,000 to 5,000 portable 
ventilators (McNeil, 2006). The US government plans to purchase an additional 6,000 
ventilators over the course of 2006 (Russell, 2006). Some hospitals have begun to stockpile 
disposable ventilators that can run on a hospital’s oxygen supply and can be purchased for $50 
to $100 (McNeil, 2006).  
Financial awards 
Supply can also be increased through the provision of financial awards. For example, the 
creation of award systems for prototype vaccine development has been proposed as a means 
of increasing manufacturing capacity (Booy, Brown, Grohmann & MacIntyre, 2006). Under 
award systems, vaccine manufacturers would be encouraged to develop prototype vaccines 
based on strains similar to the one likely to cause a pandemic. The manufacturers would carry 
out clinical trials on these vaccines and receive regulatory approval. Then once a pandemic 
emerged the companies could submit applications to regulatory agencies considering the new 
vaccines simply ‘variants’ or their previous products rather than entirely new vaccines 
(requiring the same rigorous clinical studies and approval processes).  
In April of 2005, the government awarded a $97 million contract to Sanofi Pasteur for the 
development of a cell-based vaccine from current virus strains. More recently, in May of 
2006, the government announced the provision of $1 billion in contracts split among five 
vaccine manufacturers to develop cell-based manufacturing capacity within the US (HHS, 
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2006). These types of awards may be critical to efforts to increase US domestic influenza 
vaccine capacity. These types of policies may also be applicable to the development of new 
antiviral drugs. 
Advanced purchase agreements 
Advance purchase agreements are another mechanism to give companies incentives to 
produce quantities of products the market would not induce them to produce. Advance 
purchase agreements are most appropriately applied to technologies that cannot be purchased 
currently since they have yet to be developed or commercialized. In these initiatives, 
governments agree to purchase a specified number of doses of a vaccine once it is developed. 
A secure market and specified price give companies the confidence to invest in what would 
otherwise be a risky investment. Similarly, stimulating the development of new antiviral drugs 
through advanced purchase agreements would provide incentive for new drug development 
while also enhancing the size of the US stockpile (Daems et al, 2005).  
While advance purchase contracts would provide incentives for companies they could also 
waste government resources as governments would be locked into purchases regardless of 
whether the technologies turn out to actually be needed. Setting specific timeframes for the 
development of vaccines is critical in making these agreements work. However, setting rigid 
timelines may also reduce manufacturers’ willingness to commit to production if the 
governments could back-out of the contracts if development took longer than expected.  
The WHO (Sep 2006) proposes expanding current seasonal flu vaccine as a variant of advance 
purchase agreements. The expansion of seasonal flu vaccine programs would provide a 
guaranteed market for manufacturers for seasonal vaccines. In contrast to the case of 
pandemics, governments would actually be able to use most of the vaccine doses purchased 
each year. In addition, expanding seasonal flu vaccine demand would provide incentives for 
manufacturers to invest in new manufacturing capacity. This additional capacity could then be 
used to produce greater quantities of pandemic vaccines if a pandemic emerges. Expansion of 
seasonal vaccine programs could take the form of increased uptake of influenza vaccine in 
countries with existing seasonal vaccine programs or the creation of new seasonal vaccine 
programs in countries where no such programs currently exist.  
Subsidize research & development 
The subsidization of research efforts can also increase pandemic preparedness. Government 
subsidization of technology develop is most appropriate when R&D levels are insufficiently 
high due to either limited capital or due to the public good aspects of products. 
The subsidization of research efforts could promote timely vaccine development. In 
anticipation of scarce supplies, the WHO has called for the support of research efforts into the 
design of more potent vaccines requiring fewer, smaller individual doses of antigens. Initial 
results in this area have been mixed, but research into more potent vaccines is ongoing. In 
addition, further research is needed into increasing the manufacturing yield of avian influenza 
vaccines. These efforts could significantly increase the global capacity for producing 
pandemic influenza vaccines.  
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Further research and development is also important in the area of facemasks. While the 
development of reusable facemasks may not be feasible in a short time frame, IOM (2006) 
noted that the government could fund research aimed at the development of decontamination 
techniques for use with disposable facemasks13. Facemask suppliers are already at capacity 
and are unlikely to be able to support these research efforts on their own. 
Liability protection 
Offering liability protection to manufacturers is appropriate when the government is 
attempting to procure a potentially harmful product that requires product development and 
manufacturing over a shorter than average time frame. Liability protection is not needed to 
ensure availability of existing, more mature technologies such as facemasks and ventilators. 
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program was implemented in 1988 to provide 
liability protection for vaccine manufacturers. However it only covers specific side effects 
from a limited number of vaccines and would not cover a new pandemic vaccine without an 
amendment to the original act. The Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine Drug and Development 
Act of 2006, now in committee, contains provisions that would remove barriers to rapid drug 
development and reduce manufacturers’ liability in the event of a pandemic. Liability 
protections for vaccine manufacturers engaged in pandemic flu development would reduce the 
costs of manufacturing pandemic influenza vaccines. This would encourage additional 
manufacturers to invest in efforts to develop new vaccines. 
Regulatory changes  
The government can play an important role in expediting the approval and licensing of new 
drugs that could be effective against AI. Fast-track regulatory mechanisms would be critical 
for influenza vaccines and could be also is effective with regard to antiviral drugs (Daems et 
al, 2005; Gronvall & Borio, 2006). The FDA has promised to fast-track approval of Peramivir, 
an antiviral that thus far has been shown effective against AI (Roos, 2006). Fast-track approval 
processes would also reduce the costs associated with developing new drugs. These reduced 
costs would allow additional firms to enter the market in vaccines or antivirals.  
Uncoordinated regulatory approval processes in differing countries also serve as a barrier to 
greater pandemic vaccine production. Clinical trials must often be duplicated in many 
countries in order to receive approval for new vaccines. Gronvall and Borio (2006) propose 
regulatory harmonization across different countries and regions as a method for easing the 
introduction of new vaccines. Under these proposals each country would still need to approve 
new vaccines and other medicinal products but the countries could use the same clinical trial 
data. It is envisioned that vaccine manufacturers would submit a common application for 
approval from each of the different regulatory agencies. Certainty that a vaccine could be sold 
in international markets without additional regulatory costs would reduce the risk of investing 
in vaccine development. 
                                                 
13 Ideally these techniques would allow disposable masks to be decontaminated in a fashion that would not cause harm 
to users of the mask and would retain the mask’s integrity and performance. 
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  &  C O N C L U S I O N  
37 
Recommendations & 
Conclusion 
In this report, we surveyed the technologies available for detection, observation, containment, 
treatment, and prevention of an AI pandemic. We focused our analysis on those technologies 
that the US government may need to procure prior to or during a human pandemic. Despite 
the much-publicized federal emphasis on stockpiling of antiviral drugs and H5N1 vaccines, 
there are other technologies that should be considered as well. Laboratory tests are needed to 
track genetic changes in AI and to determine which flu cases are due specifically to the H5N1 
strain. Laboratory tests also provide critical information needed for the production of effective 
antiviral drugs and vaccines. Rapid diagnostic tests can be used to determine appropriate 
treatment. Facemasks and respirators are inexpensive technologies that may be effective at 
slowing the spread of influenza. 
Recommendations 
After analyzing the landscape of technologies available, and based on the policy findings 
discussed in the previous section, we have reached five recommendations. 
Recommendation 1: Government should limit research and 
development support for technologies that are adequately provisioned 
through market forces. 
We recommend that the government focus research and development funding to those 
technologies that are not supported fully by the market. Research and development funding is 
most critical when conditions do not exist for the competitive production and development of 
technologies in the market. There are many demands on the funding that has been made 
available for pandemic influenza.   For technologies such as vaccines and antivirals, there is a 
clear need for government support of R&D efforts.  
Conditions for competitive production and development of diagnostic tests are in place 
(Berndt E, Interview with authors, Nov 2006) as indicated by the wide commercial availability 
of products (WHO, 2005). There appears to be no shortage in the supply of these tests and 
production could be significantly increased if demand were to increase. For this reason, the 
industry appears to be well positioned to face a pandemic surge in demand. Also, in latter 
stages of a major pandemic, many healthcare providers would likely immediately give patients 
antivirals or other medications instead of using rapid diagnostic tests.   
The potential role of facemasks in reducing the extent of an influenza pandemic is unclear. 
Funds should be allocated to allow researchers to establish clear guidelines concerning the use 
of facemasks during a pandemic. If research shows that facemasks could be effective, 
additional research into the design of inexpensive, reusable facemasks will also be needed.  
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The primary challenge in implementing this recommendation involves how the government 
sets its research priorities. Funding decisions are currently decentralized among a range of 
different organizations including the National Institutes of Health, the National Science 
Foundation, and the Department of Health and Human Services. Many of these organizations 
have a long history of self-regulating the allocation of resources, giving priority to those 
technologies which are farthest from commercialization. The variety of sources available for 
funds ensures that no single paradigm or set of metrics are used to determine how funds 
should be committed. This distributed approach to the allocation of funds should not be 
eliminated.  
However, a formal mechanism could be designed that allows scientists, economists, public 
health officials, and health care providers to work together to establish research priorities with 
respect to influenza preparedness. Researchers and other recipients of funds should be 
encouraged to contribute to the debate on specific research directions. In order to gain the 
support of researchers, it must be made clear that this recommendation does not result in a cut 
in funding but rather a reallocation. The methodology and specific analysis tools used in 
establishing these guidelines should be made available to the public. This will allow both the 
scientific community and private industry to engage with the process, inform the research, and 
understand the current direction of funding. The research priorities established by this 
mechanism should be endorsed at the highest levels of government and be used to guide 
agencies in allocating their funds.  
The government has a great deal of influence in determining the direction of research efforts 
as the primary source of funding in many fields. Other organizations, such as private trusts, 
may intervene either by lobbying or by funding additional research if they feel that the 
government’s funding priorities are unwise. These independent efforts should be encouraged 
as they will likely strengthen public discussions of what technologies are most critical to fund. 
The response of private funding agencies should be monitored and the government should 
adjust its own funding priorities in order to ensure that government funds are being directed 
where they are needed most.  
Recommendation 2: Government must stockpile critical technologies 
that are available. 
The timeframe governing the emergence of a pandemic is highly uncertain. Markets do not 
work efficiently when there is uncertainty in demand. Since emergence of a pandemic virus is 
uncertain, private companies have little incentive to significantly increase production prior to 
the emergence of a pandemic. Even in those industries that have significant production 
capabilities, such as facemasks and ventilators, there will be a delay between the pandemic 
emerging and significant increases in production. Therefore, it is critical that the government 
stockpile the supplies that are likely to be needed immediately upon the outbreak of a 
pandemic. The government is on the right track with its goal of stockpiling 81 million doses of 
antivirals by 2008. However, stockpiling targets for other technologies such as ventilators 
should be reexamined in light of our analysis. 
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Recommendation 3: The US government should actively provide 
markets for critical technologies where a market does not currently 
exist. 
For pandemic vaccines as well as new antivirals government should actively participate in the 
creation of markets for critical technologies both by supporting their production and through 
demand stimulation.  Potential policies include advance purchase agreements and the creation 
of award systems for prototype vaccine development.  These policies could give companies 
the confidence to invest in what would otherwise be a risky investment.  In addition, 
expanding current seasonal flu vaccine programs could provide immediate demand incentives 
to expand capacity or improve manufacturing efficiency.   
For advance purchases and award systems, the primary stakeholders are government and the 
pharmaceutical companies. With advance purchase, government faces a risk that the 
technologies being procured may ultimately not be needed or effective.  Setting an appropriate 
timeline that ensures the government receives products while they could still be of use is 
essential. However, a timeline that is too rigid could reduce willingness on behalf of 
pharmaceutical companies to commit to development. Pharmaceutical companies face a risk 
that the government could back out from the agreement should delays arise.  In order to 
achieve their desired end, these agreements must adequately balance the need for rapid 
production with reasonable consideration of possible delays.  
Where advance purchase agreements are being considered for manufacturers in the US, 
individual states become important stakeholders as they will compete for the economic 
activity that a new manufacturing plant would provide.  Competition for these economic assets 
raises numerous equity concerns that the government must consider. 
In the case of awards for vaccine development, vaccine manufacturers would be 
encouraged to develop prototype vaccines based on strains similar to the one likely to 
cause a pandemic.  The manufacturers would carry out clinical trials on these vaccines 
and receive regulatory approval.  Then once a pandemic emerged the companies could 
submit applications to regulatory agencies considering the new vaccines simply ‘variants’ 
of their previous products rather than entirely new vaccines (requiring the same rigorous 
clinical studies and approval processes).  For these awards to be effective, the 
government must set clear and specific expectations for the end products.  These 
statements must be balanced to ensure useful products are developed while companies are 
not discouraged by overly burdensome requirements. 
 
Finally, it may be possible to increase pandemic vaccine supply indirectly by expanding 
current seasonal flu vaccine programs. The expansion of seasonal flu vaccine programs would 
provide a guaranteed market for manufacturers for seasonal vaccines, and encourage near term 
capacity expansion or improved yields within existing plants.  Additional capacity created 
through this process could then be used to produce greater quantities of pandemic vaccines if a 
pandemic emerges.   A primary challenge to this approach is that it would require increased 
buy-in from citizens in order to be successful.  If the government is not able to successfully 
encourage demand increases for seasonal influenza vaccines, it will have wasted valuable 
resources.  In addition, it will be difficult for the government to predict in advance the 
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potential capacity expansion that might result from increasing the demand for influenza 
vaccines, so it is likely that this policy is best used as a complement to other policies for 
increasing demand.   
Recommendation 4: The US government should institute emergency 
fast track approval and liability protection for vaccine and antiviral 
manufacturers.  
Development of a vaccine targeted at pandemic AI cannot commence until the pandemic virus 
strain has been isolated, and development alone is likely to take on the order of six months. 
Thus, it will be necessary to use fast-track approval for a new vaccine in order to provide for 
production and distribution that is as rapid as possible after the onset of the pandemic. In 
addition, the importance of vaccines in limiting the loss of lives during a pandemic warrants 
liability protection for manufacturers. Similar treatment is also necessary for new antiviral 
drugs. Current reliance on one antiviral drug leaves antiviral resistance as a large vulnerability. 
Alternative antiviral drugs should be considered for fast track approval by the FDA.  
The pharmaceutical industry has grown tremendously since 1976 refining both drug 
development and manufacturing processes. This makes it less like that newly developed drugs 
would have harmful side effects similar to the vaccine developed during the “Swine Flu” 
scare. Adverse impacts are more apparent with large scale drug or vaccine use. The 
government should create a compensation fund and procedural mechanisms for compensating 
individuals in the event that new drugs have side effects.  
The public’s safety should be the dominant consideration in the implementation of this 
recommendation. Fast track approval and liability protection both provide shortcuts for drug 
manufacturers and potentially expose the public to greater risk. Implementation would also 
directly involve pharmaceutical companies, who, even with liability protection would be 
exposing themselves to risk by expediting development and production of new drugs in the 
event of a pandemic. In order to work most effectively, pharmaceutical companies will have to 
believe that the liability protection and fast track approval offered by the government will 
significantly reduce their costs and allow them to bring new products to market before the 
pandemic has ended. Given the government’s reliance on pharmaceutical production for 
addressing AI, it is conceivable that pharmaceutical companies will have a significant amount 
of input into how the liability protection and compensation mechanisms work. Prior to the 
emergence of a pandemic the government should engage pharmaceutical companies and other 
stakeholders in studies of what types of liability protection are most appropriate. Health care 
providers, who face liability risk from the provision of the pharmaceuticals, should also be 
considered.  
A balance must be struck between protecting pharmaceutical companies from unforeseeable 
problems with new drugs and encouraging strict adherence to quality manufacturing practices. 
Liability protection should not exempt companies from damages due to reckless development 
strategies or unsafe manufacturing environments. Further, in order to limit costs associated 
with vaccine or drug administration, it may make sense for the government to include health 
care providers in liability protection associated with these drugs. To maintain the trust of the 
public and health care providers, the combination fast-tracking and liability protection should 
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be limited to crisis-response. One possible mechanism for this would be an expansion of the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program for use in emergencies with a sunset clause. 
A second challenge likely to arise in the implementation of this recommendation is managing 
the public’s confidence in the safety of drugs; individuals must be willing to receive the new 
drugs. The public will likely want guarantees that manufacturing and safety standards are 
being met in pharmaceutical manufacturing plants. Compensation provided by the 
government to victims would have to be of a sufficient size, transparency, and speed to 
discourage individuals from seeking damages in the courts.  
Recommendation 5: The government should provide incentives for 
manufacturers to increase domestic manufacturing capacity of critical 
technologies. 
If pandemic influenza reaches the US, it will probably already have affected other parts of the 
world. Pandemic emergencies abroad will likely lead to international supply chain disruptions. 
Foreign manufacturing facilities may not fulfill contracts if the country in which they are 
based experiences a pandemic crisis. Without domestic manufacturing capacity, the US 
cannot ensure adequate supplies of vaccines, antiviral drugs, and other crucial AI 
technologies.  
Increasing domestic manufacturing capacity requires that the government provide 
economic incentives to manufacturers of critical technologies. These incentives should 
encourage both domestic and foreign manufacturers to expand or build plants in the US. 
Incentives should also address production time. For example, advance purchase 
agreements might take into account manufacturing time by having the government pay 
more to vaccine companies if they produce vaccines faster. However, the emphasis on 
time must be balanced concerns for the public safety. Alternatively, the government 
could directly subsidize manufacturing expansion, or provide tax incentives to entice 
foreign firms to build plants in the US. 
Another advantage of domestic manufacturing capacity is increased government scrutiny and 
response. For example, British vaccine manufacturer Chiron discovered contamination in 
several influenza vaccine batches in 2004. The US government stopped importation of 
Chiron’s vaccines, leaving the US with only half its expected supply (Pearson, 2004). Had this 
problem occurred in a US facility, the FDA may have been able to respond quickly and work 
with the manufacturer to resolve the problem, thereby preventing the supply disruption. 
Government policy already addresses this recommendation to some degree. The 
government recently gave $1 billion to five vaccine manufacturers to install domestic 
vaccine plants that use new, efficient cell-based production methods. Additionally, the 
government has negotiated with Roche to increase its antiviral production capacity on US 
soil over the next several years. 
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Conclusion 
Ten years after the first case of H5N1 in humans was documented in Hong Kong, most 
nations remain woefully unprepared for a pandemic. The amount of legislation and 
funding focused on preparing for a pandemic has increased dramatically in the past two 
years. To date, however, few studies have compared the various technologies that could 
be procured to limit the potential impact of a major human pandemic in the US. This 
study aims to help fill the gap by studying the importance of various AI technologies and 
their likely availability if a pandemic were to emerge. In the course of the study, we 
developed a technology map framework to help guide our analysis. In addition, we 
completed a comparative market analysis and matched technologies with policy options 
that could help to ensure their availability. 
Some mature technologies - including laboratory tests, rapid diagnostic tests, and 
facemasks - have pre-existing markets and some degree of scaleable manufacturing 
capacities. Government procurement of these technologies appears not to be necessary. 
Other technologies including existing antiviral drugs and ventilators would likely not 
scale well facing a surge in demand. Stockpiling of these technologies by government 
and private organizations is important to ensure that adequate supplies are available at the 
onset of a pandemic. Stockpiling may also stimulate the construction of new 
manufacturing capacity.  
Finally, the unique nature of vaccines and antivirals represent special cases where 
extraordinary measures such as extending liability protections and guaranteeing fast-track 
approval may be necessary to stimulate production to adequate levels. For these 
technologies the government may also need to utilize advanced purchase agreements or 
financial awards to ensure that adequate quantities of the products will be made available 
once a pandemic emerges. 
The evolution of viruses is a highly unpredictable process. No one can predict whether an 
H5N1 avian influenza pandemic will emerge on the timeframe of weeks, months or 
years. The pandemic may never arise at all. However, the widespread disruption on 
unprecedented scales that such a pandemic could cause warrants careful, urgent pre-
pandemic planning with an emphasis on ensuring the availability of the technologies that 
will be most effective in limiting negative impacts. 
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